X method is presented for developing descriptions of future scenarios and using expert judgment to assess bounds on the probabilities of these scenarios.
Multiple attributes are used to describe the important features of the scenarios, and the scenarios are defined as collections of different possible levels of the attributes. Experts assess either numerical values or bounds on various unconditional and conditional probabilities for different attribute le\.els. These are used to establish constraints for a series of linear programs which are solved to determine the highest and lowest possible probabilities for each scenario. An application is uresented to the assessment of ootential threats against nuclear material hateguards systems. L Kq~ordst planning; scenarios; nuclear safeguards Systematic planning for the future usually involves forecasting relevant future conditions. Significant features of the future are often uncertain, and it is desirable to account explicitly for these uncertainties in planning. The use of scenarios-internally consistent descriptions of possible future conditions and events-has expanded over the past 15 years.
C\'ith this approach, several different scenarios are constructed which cover the range of possible future conditions, and the probability of each future scenario is estimated. This information is then used in planning and decision making.
One difficulty with this method is that historical information may be only indirectly relevant to estimation of probabilities for future scenarios, and it may thus be necessary to use some other method to determine these probabilities. This paper presents a method for using expert judgment to do this which overcomes certain limitations of past approaches.
M'e also present an application of the method. 
Background
The use of scenarios in planning has received increasing attention over the past 15 years.1 In this section we review cross-impact analysis (which is closely related to the work presented here) and discuss limitations in previous methods for implementing this approach. The basic features of cross-impact analysis are illustrated by SMIC 74,' in which the following steps are carried out: Events e,, ez, . , e, are constructed, each being considered relevant to the scenarios of interest. The unconditional probabilityp(e$ of each event occurring is assessed from experts. The conditional probabilities p(e; ej) and p(e; e$ are also assessed, where ej is the complement ofeJ:. The assessed information is corrected so that for the finai results 0 Gp(e,) 6 1, P(&j) P(q) = /J(ejiei) p(eJ, and P(4-j) P(ej) + P(e;lej) = p(e;). A second limitation is that they deal with binary events which either do, or do not, occur; in many planning problems, it is more natural to consider attributes (factors) which can take on more than two different levels. For example, there is no natural way to describe the price of oil simply in terms of events either occurring or not.
In the next section we discuss a new approach which addresses these two limitations.
Approach
Our basic approach can be illustrated by a simplified example. Suppose an electric utility is deciding whether to plan construction of either a coal-or an oil-fired steam turbine power plant to supply its customers from 1995 to 2035. regulations permit use ofoil, and coal is substantially cheaper than oil.
While experts might provide probability information in terms of er and es, it is only necessary to obtain probabilities for S1, S,, S,, and S,. If joint probabilities are available over e, and es, then it is straightforward to obtain probabilities for the scenarios.
In this illustration, the saving obtained by defining the four scenarios is not great: there are only two more possible combinations of et and e2 than scenarios.
In the application discussed below, there are eight attributes with a total of 512 different possible combinations of levels-but only 19 scenarios are needed to adequately describe possible future conditions for planning purposes. Since it will be necessary only to obtain the probabilities for these 19 scenarios, considerably less elicitation wifl be needed than if probabilities were to be obtained for all 5 12 possible combinations of attribute IeveIs.
Our approach to determining scenario probabilities, based on the ideas just illustrated, has the following steps:
1. Determine a set of discrete valued attributes e,, e,, . . . , e, which cover all concerns that are relevant for the planning problem of interest.
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Determine the set of relevant scenarios for the planning problem. This set will be collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive over the possible combinations ofe,, e,, _ . _ , en. In addition, let the procedure allow:
iii. comparison of the magnitude of the probabilities of any two specific elements t and u in T. 
teI& (lc)
Conditional Probabilities. Let E, represents a specified set of levels for all attributes except the till. The conditional probability that the iIh attribute equals ei, given the other attributes are in Ei, will be denoted P(e; E,); further, let (ei,&) be the set of t such that the ilhattribute equals e; and the other attributes are in Ei. Then an assessed conditional probability p', as discussed in item ii above, imposes one of the following constraints:
Here Equation (2a) applies when an upper bound is assessed, (2b) when a specific numerical value is assessed, and (2~) when a lower bound is assessed.
The expressions in Equation (2) can be rewritten in terms ofp, by applying standard conditional and total probability definitions:
comparison of probabilities for two specific elements in T, as discussed in item iii above, imposes one of the following constraints:
Pl greater than, equal to, or less than P,.
Bounds on scenario probabilities. Let S,, S,, . . . , S, represent the set ofscenarios used, where this set is collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive over T. Then the upper bound on the probability, P(Si) ofSi occurring, where procedures, and other steps taken at a facility handling nuclear materials to keep the material safe from hostiie action.) The ultimate purpose for developing these scenarios, and their associated probabilities, was to aid design work to improve the performance of NMS systems.
To develop scenarios and associated probabilities, we followed the live-step process discussed in the last section. Our main purpose was development of methodoIogy, and the work presented below does not represent a final characterization ofadversaries. During Step 1 of our process, eight attributes were determined to characterize potential adversaries (see Table 11 , and the scales also shown in the Table  were constructed to describe possible levels ofeach attribute that an adversary might possess. Standard decision analysis methods were used in determining the attributes and scales.7 Care was taken to assure that the set of scales was complete, nonr~dundant, operational, and of minimum size.
With the attribute levels shown in Table 1 , there are 4 x 27 = 512 different possible scenarios characterizing adversaries.
However, examination of the various different possible combinations of attribute levels showed that many of these would pose similar threats to a NMS system. Since the planning problem ofinterest was to assist in improving such systems, there was no need to distinguish between different adversaries who posed similar threats.
A detailed consideration of the various possible threat scenarios, carried out during Step 2 of the process discussed in the last section, identified the 19 distinct threat scenarios described in Table 2 .
These scenarios are more explicitly described as collections of the 5 12 different types of adversaries delined by the various possible combinations of attribute levels in High: a group of people with some experience in theft and criminal activity Low: a group or individual inexperienced in theft and criminal activity Seeking: Adversary will take chances which threaten his own life or welfare Avoiding: Adversary will not accept significant probability of loss of life or capture.
Seeking: Adversary is willing to risk lives and welfare of those not in adversary group Avoiding: Adversary unwilling to do this Kirkwood and Pollock." Assessing probabilities. :\ detailed questionnaire was prepared to assess judgments from experts concerning the probabilities that a potential adversary would have the various levels of attributes shown in Table 1 . In particular, unconditional probability distributions were assessed over several of the attributes as well as conditional probability distributions over these same attributes, given that the level ofone other attribute was specified.
The questionnaire furnished general background information on other theft situations that are analogous in some way to theft from a Nuclear Material Safeguards System. The questionnaire was self-explanatory, but not designed to be self-administered.
The experts were questioned to determine the reasons for their answers and to reduce the chances of' the various usual assessment errors in judgmental probabilities."
Determining scenario probabilip bounds. The two sets of optimization problems (5) and (6) were solved to obtain bounds on the probabilities for the 19 threat scenarios in Table 2 , given the information assessed horn the experts. Solution of these linear programs is conceptually straightforward:
there are numerous programs available that will solve linear programs larger than these. However, manually entering the data would be very tedious since there w-ere 3 12 different pt's and several dozen constraints. Notes:a: using only unconditional probability responses; b: using unconditional probability responses and some conditional probability responses.
To 
Results of the application
The probability assessments discussed above were carried out for three experts. All three experts found it possible to give meaningful answers to both the unconditional and conditional probability questions.
When attempts were made to obtain bounds for the scenario probabilities based on the data for each expert, it turned out there was no set of pt obeying the axioms ofprobability theory that matched the elicited data. For two of the experts, the inconsistency remained as long as any of the conditional probability data were used, while with the third, some (but not all) of the conditional data could be utilized and consistency retained. The bounds that result when the inconsistent conditional probability assessments are omitted are shown in Table  3 where the three experts are designated A, B and C. This appliction shows that the methodology in this paper is a viable way of analysing scenarios described by attributes with multiple levels. However, it is diffkult to assess consistent probability information in these complex situations.
